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0. Consideraciones generales sobre el mercado docente

0.1. OECD Policy Review – February 2004: “The Quality of the Teaching Workforce”

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/9/29478720.pdf>

What labour market features affect teacher recruitment?

Distinctive features of the teacher labour market shape the way that it works and how teachers are matched to schools. First, in most countries teacher employment is part of the public sector, and is strongly influenced by the size of public spending on schools and the general conditions governing public sector work. Government often has a key influence on the supply of teacher education programmes and the requirements to certify teachers. Moreover, the government also often regulates the functioning of the teacher labour market by establishing bargaining laws, reward mechanisms, or recruitment and selection processes.

Second, the highly segmented nature of the teacher labour market reduces the scope for a flexible and open market. In most countries entry to teaching requires certain pre-determined qualifications, teachers at different levels of schooling and in different subject areas often require specialist qualifications, and internal mobility is very limited.

Third, teacher labour market institutions also play an important role. The level of centralisation of bargaining is among the most influential. Salaries and/or levels of employment are typically determined through a process of collective bargaining involving various levels of government and teacher unions, which reduces the flexibility of the teacher labour market.

In general, the characteristics and performance of individual teachers are not reflected in negotiated compensation packages, and entry from outside the profession is restricted. Also, to a large extent, reward mechanisms ignore the stratified nature of the market – e.g. it is often difficult to pay more to attract teachers in short supply. Contractual arrangements such as the type of appointment (e.g. fixed-term versus permanent), the institution of a probationary period, or the existence of mechanisms for dismissal have a large influence over the rate at which the teacher labour market is able to adjust to mismatches between demand and supply. For instance, the risks associated with making a selection error are reduced if a probationary period allows identification of those who are not suited to the profession.

Fourth, another powerful influence on the efficiency of the teacher labour market is the organisation of the recruitment and selection of teachers. The process leading to the hiring of skilled teachers is complex and relatively expensive. Employers and employees are faced with substantial costs associated with the acquisition of information influencing decisions. This often leads employers to use more easily measured qualification criteria (e.g. certification status, years of experience, university attended) as opposed to a broader assessment of candidates (e.g. interviews, specific work assignments, class teaching performance and peer reviews) that may give a better guide to teaching quality. In addition, the often limited participation of schools in the selection of their teachers considerably reduces the extent to which teachers meet school needs.

1. Políticas de gestión de Recursos Humanos en una muestra seleccionada de países de la OECD.

Políticas y gestión de los colegios en PISA 2003

Porcentaje de estudiantes en colegios cuyos directores informan que los colegios son responsables de los siguientes aspectos de la gestión del establecimiento

	Nombrar profesores	Despedir profesores	Establecer salario base profesores
Alemania	17,6	6,3	1,0
Australia	61,7	47,5	20,0
Bélgica	83,1	83,9	s.i.
Canadá	81,0	54,9	32,0
Corea	33,2	17,7	15,5
Dinamarca	97,4	64,5	21,4
España	36,0	36,2	6,3
EE.UU.	98,2	93,8	68,9
Finlandia	69,9	35,5	10,1
Holanda	99,5	99,3	88,3
Hungría	100,0	97,9	38,0
Irlanda	85,7	70,2	3,8
Japón	28,6	28,6	26,5
N Zelandia	100,0	99,2	18,7
Portugal	8,1	7,4	0,9
Suecia	99,5	83,0	82,8
OECD	64,0	58,0	53,0

OECD, Informe PISA 2003.

s.i. = Sin información

2. El locus de la evaluación docente.

¿Dónde se realiza la evaluación de profesores: dentro de la escuela, habitualmente por los directores, o externamente, a cargo de autoridades del sistema de nivel local, regional o central?

Espacio de la evaluación docente: escuela o externo

Alemania	Escuela
Australia	Escuela
Bélgica	Escuela
Canadá	Escuela
Corea	Escuela
Dinamarca	Escuela
España	Externo
EE.UU.	s.i.
Finlandia	No hay
Holanda	Escuela
Hungría	Externo
Irlanda	Externo
Japón	Escuela
N Zelanda	s.i.
Portugal	s.i.
Suecia	Escuela

OECD, Teachers Matter, 2005

s.i. = Sin información

3. Debates en los Estados de Unidos de América.

3.1. Evergreen Freedom Foundation, “WHAT WORKS? SUCCESSFUL REFORMS FOR K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS”

<http://www.ewfa.org/pdfs/What-Works.pdf>

Enfoque general de la propuesta

- The primary relationships fostered and protected in school settings are among parents, teachers and children. All other institutional relationships are secondary.
- Parents are allowed to choose the school that best meets the needs of their child.
- Schools are highly autonomous and competition for students is encouraged.
- The management of each school is allowed maximum flexibility in allocating resources and rewarding achievement. Management is also responsible to ensure academic achievement and financial accountability.
- Accurate information about the cost and academic performance of each school is readily available to parents, teachers, policymakers and the public.
- A good teacher is in every classroom. Learning environments are safe and orderly.
- Emulation of successful schools, teachers and management practices is encouraged.
- Schools have a clear, focused academic mission and are organized to achieve it.

Pago por desempeño

The concept of “pay for performance” is gaining widespread acceptance across ideological and partisan lines.

In 2004, the national Teaching Commission, made up mostly of Democrat education leaders, endorsed merit pay for teachers in a report titled “Teaching at Risk.”

The report stated: “We know that simply raising salaries for all teachers will not, but itself, raise student achievement. Therefore, while calling for an increase in base compensation, The Teaching Commission also urges a far-reaching break with tradition: a salary scheme that is commensurate with excellence. That is, paying teachers more for high performance, as measured by fair evaluations and clear evidence of improved student learning.”

The Teaching Commission further noted that: “In one major survey, 85 percent of teachers and 72 percent of principals said that providing financial incentives would ‘help a lot’ when it comes to attracting and retaining good teachers.”⁶

A report published by the Progressive Policy Institute, a division of the Democrat Leadership Council, found that “implementing a system of performance-based teacher pay, in which teachers are rewarded for better performance, is a highly promising approach to raising teacher quality.

Contratar y despedir

School principals need authority and flexibility to organize and motivate schools to achieve their academic mission. Currently, principals in Washington’s schools have very little authority over hiring, firing or the school budget, and schools are required to comply with a set of onerous rules and regulations.

Recommendations

- Give school principals authority to hire and fire school employees and direct and modify school budgets.
- Adopt collective bargaining laws that allow teachers to choose their professional workplace representation.

3.2. Texas Public Policy Foundation, “Eight Facts About Teacher Pay And Teacher Retention In Texas Public Schools”, September 2002

<http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2002-09-25-teacherpayfacts.pdf>

Breve descripción de la situación laboral de los maestros en el estado de Texas. Algunos puntos importantes: se establece que no hay escasez de profesores sino escasez de profesores especializados; la retención de los buenos profesores es un problema sin resolver; los salarios por hora trabajada de los profesores no son bajos.

Sugerencias de políticas públicas

- descentralizar la contratación de los profesores, y que sean los distritos escolares quienes despiden/contratan a los profesores.
- Los salarios deben ser establecidos por condiciones locales de oferta y demanda.
- Se debe incentivar el pago por desempeño.
- Incentivar la especialización de los profesores
- Establecer sistemas de accountability para que los colegios resuelvan sus problemas y no los enmascaren

Four Principles to Guide State Policy on Teacher Pay

Principle 1: Teachers are not, and should not become employees of the State. The State's role in determining teacher pay is and should remain limited because teachers are employees of local school districts. School district responsibility for hiring, firing and paying teachers is a key element of local control. The primary role of local districts in determining teacher pay should be preserved.

Principle 2: Local supply and demand, not artificial pay scales, should determine teacher pay. Local district money is available for targeted teacher pay raises if districts are freed from state pay scales. Funds that would otherwise be spent for automatic increases for under-performing teachers or teachers for which there is ample supply could instead be targeted to highly effective teachers and to teachers in short supply.

Principle 3: Across-the-board pay raises should be avoided at all costs. Paying all teachers the same and granting automatic increases, regardless of classroom effectiveness, rewards mediocrity and reduces the incentive for exerting extra effort in the classroom. Across-the-board pay raises, including increased benefits, are counterproductive.

Principle 4: A fair performance-based rating policy can and should be developed by the State. With student academic performance data, the State can establish a fair teacher rating system based on student improvement rather than a single test score in a given year. Teacher performance measures should recognize the learning disadvantages certain students may have and that teachers must overcome.

3.3. Frederick M. Hess, American Enterprise Institute, and Martin R. West, The Brookings Institution, "A BETTER BARGAIN" (Program on Education Policy & Governance, School of Government, Harvard University)

<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/BetterBargain.pdf>

El documento se centra el análisis de los contratos colectivos de los sindicatos de profesores y sus implicancias en términos de eficiencia.

Diagnóstico

Los contratos colectivos tienen problemas en tres aspectos:

1. Impiden la compensación (monetaria) como un medio para incentivar la contratación, recompensar y retener a los mejores elementos
2. Impide la asignación y despido de los profesores según su desempeño

3. “Sobre-regulan” la actividad escolar con normas que restringen la creatividad y que no han demostrado mejorar la capacidad de los profesores frente a sus alumnos.

Sugerencias de políticas

1. La remuneración de los profesores debe reflejar su escasez relativa y las habilidades del profesor, la dificultad de su tarea, y sus responsabilidades. Además, los beneficios de pensiones y salud deben ser semejantes a los de otros profesionales en mercados laborales equivalentes
2. Debe facilitarse la separación de aquellos docentes que no han demostrado tener un buen desempeño
3. Se debe privilegiar la satisfacción de las necesidades educacionales antes que la antigüedad
4. Los contratos de trabajo deben ser más claros y precisos en las labores de los profesores.

Recommendations

Reformers should seek to create pressures that give district officials incentives to negotiate aggressively on behalf of students and that give unions self-interested reasons to make concessions that serve student needs. The aim should be to strike a healthier balance between teachers’ understandable preferences for fair compensation, job security, and a comfortable work environment on the one hand and the cost, quality, and equity of public schooling on the other.

Contract Language

The essential task, of course, is to rewrite collective bargaining agreements (or, in non-bargaining states, relevant state laws). Officials should pursue six types of changes:

First, compensation systems should recognize and reinforce professionalism by basing pay on the scarcity and value of teachers’ skills, the difficulty of their assignments, the extent of their responsibilities, and the caliber of their work. For instance, districts should be able to pay high school science or math teachers more than social studies teachers and reward effective teachers who are willing to teach in low-performing or less desirable schools. Denver’s new ProComp salary schedule, with its multidimensional system for rewarding teachers’ skills, performance, and contributions, is a modest step in the right direction. Even more promising are systems like the one developed in the Chattanooga, Tennessee, school district, which offers bonuses for teachers whose students make strong gains on state tests.

Second, pension and health-care benefits should be structured like those offered by other organizations seeking to hire mobile, skilled, college-educated professionals. This entails shifting from defined-benefit plans to defined contribution plans (such as the 401k or 403b) that are better suited to the new economy. Similarly, cost considerations make it imperative that districts wean teachers from gold-plated health insurance, instead offering flexible benefit plans that are similar in design and employer burden to those provided to other professionals. Such modifications will allow districts to reallocate resources to the classroom, make it easier to target spending on deserving educators, and make it less costly for entrepreneurial teachers to launch new programs or to switch to charter schools.

They will also allow district compensation systems to more readily accommodate changes in the job market and local budgetary circumstances.

Third, administrators should be empowered to terminate ineffective educators much more readily. While this authority should be subject to those safeguards employed in other professional environments, local contracts should make it clear that employment in the district is “at-will.” Altering the dynamics of termination would also require increased flexibility in the evaluation process. Even the following simple clause can allow for the more efficient and timely identification of ineffective teachers: “Classroom observations and/or conferences may be increased at the discretion of the administration to provide the level of supervision and guidance necessary to resolve the identified problem(s).”¹²⁴

Fourth, personnel should be assigned to schools on the basis of educational criteria rather than seniority. To that end, contracts should not require schools to accept teachers transferring within the district or call for teacher assignment to be based on considerations other than the quality of the candidate in question and his or her fit with the relevant position. At the same time, reformers should be cautious about implementing utopian schemes for teacher assignment. They ought not presume that effective teachers can be blindly assigned to difficult schools without hurting their morale or losing them altogether. Instead, contracts should ensure that districts have the flexibility to assign staff in ways that promote learning, attract and retain quality faculty, and serve the needs of the entire district. A sample contract clause that allows districts appropriate flexibility reads, “It shall be the intent of the Board of Education to provide qualified members of the bargaining unit an opportunity to be considered for transfer. The welfare of students and, secondly, that of teachers will be the preeminent factor in all transfers.”¹²⁵

Fifth, collective bargaining provisions relating to work rules and governance should, to the extent possible, be weeded out of contracts. While it is useful and appropriate to involve teachers and union officials in crafting district policy and practice, the contract should not give the union a formal role in such discussions. On questions such as class size, curricular development, professional development, and school start and stop times, contract language should avoid ambiguity and maximize operational flexibility. Finally, it is vital to explicitly spell out managerial prerogatives in every contract, though the utility of doing so will depend upon the energy and ingenuity of district officials. Much of the language recommended here already exists in some contracts. Nonetheless, officials in those districts frequently discuss their frustration with the contract in language remarkably similar to that of administrators and board members in districts with less contractual flexibility. This suggests the necessity of explicit language to minimize the “zone of ambiguity.” Districts must ensure that staff know how to take advantage of management rights, while school boards must ensure that the superintendent and staff are actually making full use of managerial prerogatives.

3.4. Frank Papa, Hamp Lankford And Jim Wyckoff (University At Albany, SUNY) “HIRING TEACHERS IN NEW YORK’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: CAN THE PRINCIPAL MAKE A DIFFERENCE?”, 2003

Después de entrevistar a directores de escuelas en NY, los autores concluyen que:

- Los directores tienen alta responsabilidad en la contratación de los profesores para sus escuelas. Sin embargo, hay menor autonomía en sectores urbanos y de bajo desempeño
- Hay gran diversidad en las prácticas para conseguir nuevos docentes. Pero es transversal la dificultad para contratar profesores en sectores de bajo desempeño académico y de niveles socioeconómicos bajos.
- No todos los directores valoran los mismos atributos en los profesores.

Conclusions and Implications

Although principals may not directly affect the student outcomes, they have the potential to importantly shape the environment in which students learn. An important aspect of the learning environment is the quality of the teaching workforce. Increasingly, research is documenting that teachers have an important impact on student learning.

Good teachers can improve student outcomes much more than weaker teachers. Ultimately, we are interested to know whether some principals are better at hiring teachers than others. We approach addressing this question by examining how principals structure the hiring process:

- How is the teacher hiring process structured?
 - o What control do principals have with respect to teacher hiring?
 - o How do recruitment, selection and hiring vary across schools?
 - o What attributes do principals seek in prospective teachers?
- Are some principals able to hire more qualified teachers than other principals? If so, is there a relationship to the nature of the hiring process or the attributes of the principal?

We find that:

- Principals of urban and low-performing schools have less autonomy than do their suburban and rural counterparts;
- The socio-economic status of students in urban and low-performing schools presents is reported to provide a greater obstacle to hiring teachers than compensation;
- There is great variation in the level of importance of various attributes/qualifications of prospective teachers within urbanicity categories.

These results add to the mounting evidence that suggests urban and low performing schools are disadvantaged with respect to their ability to attract and retain highly qualified teachers. However, important questions still remain. For example, are urban and low-performing schools advantaged by the lack of autonomy in hiring of teachers? Should they have more control over this process? It should be noted that these findings reflect the views of principals themselves. If we were to survey other professional staff, e.g., teacher or superintendents the responses may well differ. Additional research, perhaps in the form of case studies, could provide valuable information with regard to these questions and

others. In addition, case studies could help provide an understanding of why hiring practices are related to school characteristics/attributes far more than principal characteristics/attributes. It may be that changing hiring practices upon the arrival of a different principal is not warranted given the rather short average length of a principal's tenure and the time it would take to adjust to the new practices. However, without further research, answers to these questions will remain unknown.

3.5. Worcester Regional Research Bureau, "Education Reform And Collective Bargaining: C For Compatibility", 2003

<http://www.wrrb.org/reports/03-05education.pdf>

Se sugiere:

- Deben alinearse los incentivos de los profesores con los objetivos del Estado (esto es, mejorar la calidad académica). Esto se puede lograr con sistemas salariales ligados al mérito académico de los profesores.
- Los beneficios de la seguridad social no corresponden a la realidad del resto del mercado laboral, y deben ser reajustados.
- Los contratos deben ser más explícitos en la relación contractual de los profesores con los directores de la escuela
- Las transferencias y promociones deben ser evaluadas según los méritos de los profesores y no por antigüedad.
- Se debe evaluar a los profesores, y despedir a aquellos que resulten incompetentes, insubordinados, etc. Este proceso debe ser agilizado, pero manteniendo garantías para un trato justo a los profesores.
- Se sugiere establecer "comunidades pequeñas de educación" que velen por sus intereses en esta materia, frente a los legisladores.

Collective Bargaining Basics: Education Reform and Union Bread and Butter

The basic operation of unions and collective bargaining merits a brief introduction. The primary role of the teachers' union is to engage in collective bargaining. State law permits a majority of teachers in a district to elect an exclusive representative to negotiate the terms of all employees' contracts. A non-union-member teacher⁷ would also have his or her salary set by the contract (even if the teacher voted against this particular union representation), because collective bargaining laws permit a *majority* of workers to elect a representative for *all* workers.⁸ In this way, unions obtain the right and responsibility to be the sole representative for all employees at the bargaining table—members and non-members alike. The EAW has represented Worcester teachers in collective bargaining since the state passed a collective bargaining law for public employees in 1965.

We will begin with an analysis of the "bread and butter" issues in the Worcester contract. Specifically, we will discuss how the contract governs teachers' pay, teachers' benefits, and teachers' rights. Salary and health insurance are not only two of the most important issues to teachers, but also are the two largest items in the school budget. Teachers' salaries are 75% of all salaries in the school budget (\$113 million of \$148 million). Combined, teacher salaries (\$113 million) and health insurance (\$15 million) total \$128 million (56%) of a \$228 million budget. Here we address the following questions: How well have Worcester teachers fared under recent contracts? Is the current system fiscally

sustainable? How do current salary and health insurance provisions affect Worcester's ability to improve student achievement and meet both the demands of MERA and the Federal NCLB? What alternate approaches to compensation have other unions explored? What options might be best for Worcester?

Compensation, student achievement, and teacher quality

Teachers' unions across the nation are experimenting with teacher compensation reforms that harmonize better with various elements of education reform. TURN is a group of unions that have explored alternatives to the traditional teacher contracts and pay structures. For instance, the Denver Public Schools and the (TURN affiliate) Denver Classroom Teachers' Association Joint Task Force on Teacher Compensation have developed a comprehensive system for teachers' compensation which eliminates automatic pay raises for years of service: "The new system would reward teachers who consistently meet rigorous and high expectations—including growth in student learning—with accelerated career earnings."¹⁸ Merit-pay programs reward excellent teachers and provide incentives for others to improve. The Douglas County Federation of Teachers, in Douglas, Colorado, has had a broad performance-pay system in place since 1993 which rewards positive teacher evaluations from principals, group performance (i.e. schools or grade levels meeting student achievement benchmarks), additional skills (acquisition of specific skills that are a priority for the school district, i.e. test data analysis) and other contributions (school or district curriculum work, colleague mentoring).

Six TURN districts offer financial rewards directly to teachers when their schools meet student achievement targets (Cincinnati, Columbus, Denver, Memphis, Miami/Dade County, and New York City). Others have added incentives for teachers to achieve national board certification, which requires teachers to submit portfolios including videotapes of their teaching as well other materials and take grade-appropriate tests (Bellevue, WA; Boston, MA; Cincinnati, OH; Columbus, OH; Hammond, IN; Los Angeles, CA; Miami/Dade, FL; Minneapolis, MN; Montgomery County, MD; New York City, NY; Pinellas County, FL; Rochester, NY; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; Toledo, OH). In addition, Kentucky, Maryland, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina and Dallas, Texas have all instituted forms of merit pay.²¹ In order to connect teacher compensation and student achievement, the School Committee, in collaboration with the superintendent and the EAW, should consider some of these approaches for the WPS.

In the 1998-2000 contract, Worcester did put in place a modest rewards program that provided money for schools (not the teachers in the schools) that met certain criteria. Teachers did not get bonuses themselves—an important element in changing teacher performance; the schools received the bonus and the teachers chose how the additional resources were used. In each school that wanted to participate, a committee of teachers, administrators and parents would select what improvement the school would focus on. They could work toward improved student or staff attendance, increased parental involvement, improved student test scores, etc., and they were measured against their own stated goals. Participation was voluntary and not many schools sought the bonuses; the program was shut down in the face of budget pressure in 2001. Despite its limitations, this modest plan did demonstrate the possibility for innovation and collaboration between the WPS and the EAW.

Teachers, in general, are receptive to changes in pay structure that would include merit-based incentives, according to a recent nationwide poll by Public Agenda, a non-profit

public opinion and research organization. Sixty-seven percent (67%) of the teachers polled supported offering financial incentives to “teachers who consistently work harder, putting in more time and effort than other teachers;” 62% supported financial rewards for “teachers who consistently receive outstanding evaluations from their principals;” 70% endorsed rewarding “teachers who work in tough neighborhoods with low performing schools.”

Most teachers were opposed to linking financial incentives to student performance on standardized tests—only 38% of teachers surveyed favored such a plan.²³ Such plans are often seen as unfair due to socio-economic differences and differences in student abilities from one classroom to the next.

Another approach—and one that may be more palatable to teachers opposed to merit-pay that differentiates one teacher from another—is to link bonuses to school-wide performance measures. If the school’s aggregate test scores meet predetermined levels, then each teacher in the school would be rewarded, regardless of the performance of any specific teacher’s students. School-wide accountability measures could use refined MCAS data to eliminate factors that create a less accurate picture of school performance, such as student mobility.²⁴ A more ambitious project, but one worth considering for the long term, would be to include in a pay-for-performance model an evaluation of teachers’ “value-added” inside each classroom. The school’s combined “value added” could be measured and rewarded when appropriate. Once an annual testing system is in place (MCAS is not yet at this point), MCAS data could be used to track the progress for each student in a school. Rather than comparing a school’s average passing rate on MCAS, for instance, the school’s rate of student achievement improvement could be assessed. While school Y may be scoring well below school A in overall passing rate, the rate of student improvement in school Y might be much greater than school A. Research suggests that such a program would increase the accuracy of the school evaluation.²⁵ The entire faculty of a school could then be rewarded financially when their school meets student achievement improvement benchmarks.

This “value-added” approach does raise some potential problems, however. First, students in higher socio-economic status (SES) schools tend to perform better on state tests, and their scores may not be a reflection of quality of teachers in those schools. Teachers may try to frustrate principals’ aims by having more academically-challenged and behavior-problem students moved to someone else’s class. Schools may attempt to have minority or immigrant students moved to another school—particularly if school performance affects teachers’ compensation.

Administrators may have difficulty comparing the effects or success of teachers with honors or tracked students compared to those with heterogeneous classes. Teachers or schools may attempt to have more students labeled special education so that their “value-added” rating is not adversely impacted. School-based merit pay may create competition among teachers to transfer to schools with a higher SES that are more likely to earn the bonuses. The challenges of creating a fair and effective merit pay system are great, but some districts have moved toward that end.

Most successful performance-pay systems include a variety of ways for teachers to receive additional financial rewards, and do not simply tie raises to test scores. Douglas County, Colorado, for instance, provides for a base salary, an “outstanding teacher” designation (determined by administrators through a review of a portfolio, parent/student surveys, and formal evaluations), pay for acquiring important “skill blocks” (professional

development focused on particular areas that are important to the school), a “master teacher” designation (in Colorado, a state-defined level of licensure), “Group Incentive” pay (individual schools set student achievement goals and are rewarded for meeting them), and “Responsibility Pay” (pay for district or building responsibilities beyond teaching.)²⁶ Similarly, the Denver Classroom Teachers Association teacher compensation plan includes pay for student achievement (evaluation of student improvement over time as well as student performance on standardized tests of reading and math), professional evaluations, skills and knowledge (acquisition of school approved degrees, demonstration of school needed technical or administrative skills, or national board certification), and market incentives.

4. Asuntos debatidos en Europa

4.1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Education And Culture, IMPLEMENTATION OF “EDUCATION & TRAINING 2010” WORK PROGRAMME <http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/besttool.pdf>

Approach 1 – Organisational changes

□ Why should we consider this mechanism?

Changes in the institutional structure are important for achievement. The level of decentralisation of decision-making to individual schools (in the form of more autonomy for local management) and of centralisation of examinations encourages country-level performance. Principals usually know who the better teachers are. This ability to identify good and bad teachers should be used and complemented by an assessment in terms of student performance (see Part II on “changes in incentives” below).

□ How could we implement this mechanism?

Giving principals more discretion in rewarding teachers would be an effective way to use local knowledge. Excessive bureaucratisation hinders the use of this knowledge and often leads to duplication and dispersion of efforts and funding. Additionally, administrators should be held accountable for the impact of their hiring, retention and other management decisions on student performance. Meanwhile, centralisation of exams should be introduced if need be.

The progressive introduction of management by objectives into educational institutions and the introduction of an assessment system would give more information on the results and costs of teaching and would also respond to the demand for more efficient education.

□ A word of caution

The usual trade-offs have to be considered. Decentralisation to different levels (school, district, region) implies different trade-offs. The quality of central governance has its limitations in the access to information and imperfect reflection of local conditions; decisions at lower levels are likely to be less transparent and more sensitive to local partial interest groups. Financing from regional budgets can limit choice and competition as a

result of the limits imposed on cross-regional enrolment. Local funding is likely to increase interregional inequality and unequal access to education. Local funding could be also an obstacle to reallocating funds between educational levels in times of pronounced demographic changes. Decentralisation therefore has two components: responsibility and funding.

Moreover, systems of national examinations and school accountability incur costs (Approach 16). There are costs, both mental (for the student and teacher) and real costs, associated with extensive exam-taking. There are also potentially negative effects on socio-economic integration from increased parental choice/school accountability that may arise from such systems (Approaches 9 and 10).

□ Countries that have implemented related approaches: all countries

Message 3: More financial incentives should be introduced into European education and training systems so as to compensate for the constraints in public budgets and introduce a stronger performance element into the system. Such incentives would (e.g. in the case of non-compulsory education) combine a stronger diversification of funding possibilities and a better mix between public and private financing. Concerning the teaching force, a more diversified wage and reward system for teachers/trainers/principals based on learner performance would encourage motivation of the staff and raise quality for the learners.

Approach 11 – Pay-for-performance relationship

□ Why should we consider this mechanism?

Teacher/trainer jobs and wages should be more dependent on the performance of students/trainees. Merit pay for teachers/trainers or rewards to schools imply moving to a direct pay-for-performance relationship. Moreover, teachers' pay has in some countries decreased relative to that of other professions.

□ How could we implement this mechanism?

Merit pay should not depend on subjective or political criteria and lead to undesirable competition among teachers. It requires a transparent and equal system of evaluation. Teachers' jobs and wages should be related to students' *improvements* in performance rather than to *absolute performance*. However, it is no trivial task to establish such a relationship, because value added in education is difficult to measure. A scheme rewarding absolute performance can adversely affect treatment of students from a weaker social background. A school choice system based on per pupil formula funding can be the way to efficient operation not requiring complex testing.

□ A word of caution

However, teachers/trainers need to be motivated too, of course. They cannot be held accountable for the performance of the entire school. Thus we need to think about merit pay systems linked to individual teacher performance.

Merit pay systems and decentralisation (Approach 1) may work in opposite directions. Do we decentralise and trust the Head Teacher to recruit, retain and pay the best teachers in

the way she/he sees fit? Or do we want an equal, transparent merit system of pay that inevitably will need to be more centrally controlled¹²?

The class size policy (Approach 2) and teacher pay/quality policies (Approaches 11, 12, 13, 14) may conflict. Reductions in class sizes will increase the demand for teachers and may (with no increase in teacher pay) lead to reductions in teacher quality. Too much emphasis on class size and not enough on teachers would seem to be a mistake.

□ Countries that have implemented related approaches: Sweden.

Approach 12 – Reward systems

□ Why should we consider this mechanism?

Promotion and retention in jobs should be partly differentiated according to the quality level of the teachers (it should indeed be the same for school principals and other administrative and support personnel).

□ How could we implement this mechanism?

Schools should be able to attract higher-quality teachers thanks to additional resources or better working conditions. These decisions should be taken at local level.

□ Countries that have implemented related approaches: Sweden.

Approach 13 – Teacher/trainer assessment and appraisal

□ Why should we consider this mechanism?

Teacher/trainer quality is, for instance, reputed for partially overcoming the deficits of the home environment. The quality of the teacher/trainer modifies substantially the performance of the learners. It can also push learners with good preparation even farther. Moreover, teacher scores on achievement tests have a good correlation with student outcomes, so the assessment of teaching is crucial.

□ How could we implement this mechanism?

A tightening of the requirements (raising the course work requirement for teacher/trainer certification, testing teachers/trainers on general and/or specific knowledge, requiring specific degrees up to master's level) is not necessarily the right answer. Too stringent input requirements - without a parallel well-designed wage increase - may conversely reduce the supply of (good and bad) teachers/trainers. It is important, however, to keep a minimum floor on quality without building a ceiling that keeps interested potential good teachers/trainers out.

□ A word of caution

Unfortunately, not much is known about the appropriate training and hiring standards¹⁴. Other aspects of personnel management include mentoring, support and tenure review. This evaluation process should in any case avoid opacity and ensure equal treatment.

□ Countries that have implemented related approaches: Norway, Sweden.

Approach 14 – Career structures with reward systems

□ Why should we consider this mechanism?

There is a substantial variation in teacher/trainer quality even among those with similar education and experience. This variation is related to various factors: differences in skills and effort; inadequate retention and hiring practices; heterogeneity in the quality and number of teachers/trainers according to the area of study. This may necessitate different career structures.

□ How could we implement this mechanism?

A policy that retained the best teachers/trainers longer and dropped the least effective teachers/trainers sooner would lead to substantial improvements in the average quality of the teacher/trainer force. Principals and human resources should indeed be able to choose their appropriate teachers/trainers. More fundamentally, teachers'/trainers' careers should be more directly related to learner performance so that they could better respond to these incentives.

4.2. Anja Balanskat & Paul Gerhard, “Head teachers’ professional profile and roles across Europe, 2005

http://eunbrux09.eun.org/ww/en/pub/insight/thematic_dossiers/articles/survey_profile.htm

El diferente papel de los directores en la gestión de las escuelas y su rol en la contratación.

Administrative, pedagogic or strategic (from high (administrative) to medium level of presence (pedagogic/ strategic))

Concerning the role of head teachers, there are two types of profile: one we might call the “balanced role” between the administrative, the pedagogical and the strategic (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Catalonia, Sweden, Northern Ireland with Lithuania moving towards a more strategic role) and the other where the head teacher would be confined to a more administrative role (in England, Estonia, Swiss [Primary schools] and Belgium [Flanders]. In some countries, like Ireland and Norway, the role is becoming increasingly administrative. There again, leadership roles are influenced by organisational or external factors, for example, increasing education legislation as in Ireland.

Hiring staff (medium level of presence)

Leadership can take many forms at school and the tasks of the head teacher define the leadership style. In countries such as the UK, Sweden or Norway, head teachers take an active part when it comes to hiring staff. They can, in some way, choose their ‘team’ and hire personnel according to specific needs or pedagogic options they have.

Whereas in other countries, where teachers are 'placed' (Germany, Slovenia) the role of the head teacher is very different in that they are dealing with characters and teacher's profile which might not correspond to their type of leadership.

4.3. El Caso De Holanda: Marion Meesters, "ATTRACTING, DEVELOPING AND RETAINING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS". Country Background Report For The Netherlands; OECD, January 2003

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/23/2501446.pdf>

School autonomy and teacher policy

Deregulation and decentralisation are part of an ongoing process aimed at devolving responsibilities from the level of central government to the level of the schools as education organisations. However, this process cannot produce the required innovation in management overnight and the intended administrative changes are not always easy to realise. Levels of authority other than central government intervene and interfere with the proclaimed autonomy of schools. For instance, where provincial authorities mainly have supervisory duties, municipal authorities perform a wide variety of tasks and issue local regulations with regard to school buildings, municipal policy in relation to disadvantaged groups in society, school counselling and advisory services. With regard to human resources management, schools also encounter regulations issued by institutions administered by the social partners (organisations representing employers and employees), such as the Replacement and the Participation Fund.

Sometimes, there are conflicting interests at the various levels of authority. This is the case with the decentralisation of financial and managerial responsibilities. Schools are made responsible for their human resources management at the level of the school, but at the same time agreements are entered into at a different level which could have a considerable impact on the room for manoeuvre that schools have.

Although schools have their own budgets to tailor conditions of service to their own personnel requirements, this same budget has to be used to pay for individual rights granted to employees by other levels of authority. Paid parental leave is an example of the latter. Another example of conflicting interests at various levels is the case of teacher training institutes. They have to meet the demands of schools and deliver 'tailor-made' teachers, but at the same time they have to develop a high-quality curriculum based on standards of competence that are applicable to the professional group of teachers as a whole.

It seems that the realisation of the concept of an autonomous school as a professional learning community in an open education labour market, where the demand and supply of teaching staff are balanced, will take more effort and time than expected.

Main policy concerns

139. In the Netherlands, school boards recruit, select and appoint their own staff. This has not changed over the past decades. However, schools have to adhere to some general rules and over the years the government has tried to influence recruitment strategies by issuing certain regulations. In the first half of the nineties, surpluses on the education labour market predominated and government intervention was mainly aimed at preventing

dismissals and promoting the deployment of unemployed teachers. In the second half of the nineties, these concerns became less pressing and were replaced by shortages of staff.

By then, the decentralisation and deregulation of personnel management were well under way and schools increasingly developed their own personnel policies. Concerns about diversity within the teaching staff and within management of schools came to the fore. In particular, efforts were made to appoint more teachers from ethnic minorities and more women to management positions in school. It is also important to note that in this period changes were made to the regulations governing appointments and conditions of service to keep them in line with the modernisation of schools as professional learning communities, as well as to contribute to a more flexible labour market. In this area, a balance had to be found repeatedly between giving school boards a fairly free hand and the accountability of the government.

General regulations

140. Schools or school boards implement their own procedures with regard to the recruitment of staff.

Any person who has a teaching qualification may be appointed as a teacher at the level of his or her qualification and can teach in the school types and subjects for which he or she is qualified. Temporary dispensation can be granted by the Inspectorate of Education. The school or school board determines the vacancies and the way they should be filled. However, appointments by the schools are subject to generally applicable legislation.

141. Since 1996 the main legislation governing the legal status of staff became more general and schools and institutions were given more scope to determine their own policies. In the past, all employees in publicly managed education institutions were subject to the same provisions, laid down in the Decree in Relation to the Legal Status of Education Personnel (RPBO). However, since the 1990s, the responsibility for negotiating conditions of employment has been devolved – in part – to each separate education sector.

The primary conditions of service (such as the different functions and salary scales) are regulated at the central level. The secondary and tertiary conditions of service (fringe benefits), such as career patterns, inservice training, the starting level in the salary scales for particular functions and additional rewards) are regulated at the decentralised level (see also chapter 2).⁹¹

142. Formally staff in state schools and institutions are civil servants in terms of the Central and Local Government Personnel Act. Staff in private schools enter into a contract with the school board (which is governed by civil law). As such they fall under the provisions of civil law in so far as the relevant education legislation and regulations based on this do not deviate from these provisions. Private sector staff can be assumed to share the status of public-sector personnel with regard to the conditions of service determined by the government.⁹²

143. When a teacher is appointed at a school, he or she receives a letter of appointment. This letter of appointment contains the details of the agreement, such as the date on which the appointment commences, the position and salary scale, whether the appointment is permanent or temporary, the number of hours to be worked, the place of work and the

actual salary. A temporary appointment can only be agreed when an employee enters the employment of the school and may last for a maximum of 12 months. In specific cases, the temporary appointment can be extended (once) by a maximum of 12 months. Before 1998, temporary contracts could be given for a total period of five years. Temporary appointments can also be agreed in cases of temporary replacement, temporary positions, specific projects or if the candidate does not hold an official teaching qualification. The salary of a teacher is determined at the moment of appointment on the basis of the salary scale corresponding to the position.⁹³

144. Since 1995, all staff in primary and secondary schools have been employed directly by the competent authority (the school board) rather than being employed by a particular school. This implies that all staff who move to another school governed by the same school board are not dismissed and reappointed, but simply transferred. This arrangement is a direct result of redundancy allowance policies, which will be discussed later in this chapter.⁹⁴ On average a school board in primary education governs 3.5 schools; in secondary education this is 1.6 schools.⁹⁵

145. There is no government scheme aimed at distributing teachers fairly among schools. Teachers are appointed and dismissed by the competent authority of a school (school board). There is an open selection procedure and no placement system exists. Teachers are free to apply for any job they like and change jobs if they so wish.⁹⁶

Determining and filling vacancies by schools

146. Schools or school boards decide themselves whether they have staff vacancies. They can form new vacancies out of several portions of vacant teaching hours, or split large vacancies up into smaller jobs, if this is necessary. They are also autonomous in their choice of recruitment strategies. Schools will generally try to fill a vacancy with someone from a school within their own school board. If this is not successful, external candidates are considered.

4.4. Debates En El Reino Unido: Tina Anderson “BRITAIN PROVIDES GLIMPSE OF CAMPBELL’S VISION”; Teacher Newsmagazine Volume 16, Number 3, January/February 2004

<http://www.bctf.ca/ezine/archive/2003-2004/2004-01/support/10Britain.html>

Resumen

La autora es pesimista con respecto al sistema educacional británico, al menos si se mantiene su actual diseño (que la ella atribuye a las reformas neo-liberales del gobierno de Thatcher). Describe en qué consiste esta crisis, principalmente desde el punto de vista del profesorado británico. Afirma que todos los problemas pueden atribuirse a la falta de financiamiento. Ella se detiene sobre los siguientes asuntos específicos:

- A partir de enero de 2003, son las propias escuelas las que deben contratar (y despedir) a sus profesores y, debido a la escasez de recursos, muchas escuelas públicas se ven en la obligación de no contratar profesores de reemplazo, etc.
- Pérdida de autonomía de los profesores en la sala de clases debido al restringido currículo nacional “impuesto”.

- Sobrecarga de trabajo administrativo para responder a las demandas de “accountability” (los profesores se demoran más planificando lo que van a hacer que haciéndolo realmente).

5. El debate en el Sud-este de Asia

5.1. Elizabeth M. King And Susana Cordeiro Guerra, “EDUCATION REFORMS IN EAST ASIA: POLICY, PROCESS AND IMPACT”, 2005

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/Chapter-9.pdf>

Resumen

El documento trata sobre diversos asuntos relacionados con la descentralización educativa, pero entrega algunas luces sobre el tratamiento a los docentes.

- En el este de Asia, sólo Filipinas no ha descentralizado formalmente la administración de la educación primaria. Una consideración política: los profesores cuentan los votos en las elecciones, y se teme que una reforma impopular pueda variar los resultados de las votaciones.
- En China, los directores tienen responsabilidad sobre la calidad de la enseñanza pues gozan de autonomía en la contratación de los profesores.
- Como otros ejemplos de descentralización en la contratación de docentes, se menciona la existencia de concejos educativos en Brasil, El Salvador, Australia y Nicaragua.
- Se sugiere que no basta con entregar poderes para contratar y despedir profesores. Además se debe entregar autoridad para premiar, compensar y potenciar a los docentes.
- En el este asiático no existe un sistema de contratación que predomine sobre otro. Incluso, puede existir una mezcla de centralización y descentralización de funciones en un mismo país (como en Indonesia).
- Se sugiere que entregar mayores responsabilidades sobre las decisiones de las escuelas, provocará un mayor grado de compromiso de los docentes, y un mejor sentimiento de responsabilidad por los resultados obtenidos.
- El diseño de sistemas de recompensas para los docentes ha demostrado ser eficaz en el aumento de su desempeño en aula.

Who Makes Which Decisions?

With different levels of government involved in multiple areas of decision making, the goal is to ensure delineation and alignment of responsibilities, coordination, and information sharing. Although these challenges may have existed before decentralization, pressure to address them has intensified. Decentralization is not likely to improve the education system if local governments have the authority to hire and fire teachers but not to influence their promotion, compensation, and development, or if schools have the authority to choose teaching methods but not textbooks.

Patterns emerge in the locus and mode of 22 of 38 decisions related to secondary education in the East Asian countries (see table 9.3). Setting curriculum content, instruction time, and teachers' salaries, and allocating resources to schools, remain the

domain of the national or state and provincial governments. In contrast, all five countries leave the choice of teaching methods and support activities for students (such as remedial classes) entirely to schools; four of five countries also assign decision making on teachers' careers to local entities. Cambodia is the most centralistic with respect to the 22 decisions.

Teacher management

Different levels of government make decisions regarding teachers, often leading to confusion and inefficiencies. These decisions range from teacher training to recruitment, deployment, performance evaluation, human resources databases, payroll, and redeployment.

Some countries decentralize some functions, such as hiring and firing of teachers, while keeping others effectively centralized, such as setting compensation levels.

Indonesia illustrates a mixed—and confusing— policy regarding teacher management. The 2003 Education Law stipulates that the central and district governments share responsibility for “getting educators and education personnel to ensure the implementation of good quality education programs” (Article 41), and that these governments will “supervise and develop educational personnel in education units” (Article 44). However, many aspects of teacher management remain centralized, including managing the personnel database, registering personnel actions, and transmitting this information to the payroll system.

While districts manage personnel and payroll, the recording of such actions—necessary to trigger the payroll—is still centralized, and, according to civil service law, the central government retains much authority over teacher wages, position allowances, family and rice allowances, and even honoraria. In focus-group discussions, teachers reported that while they support decentralization, they prefer central management of their employment (World Bank 2004a). According to teachers, given that processes such as promotion still require the center's approval, decentralization has slowed action on personnel matters because it has added a bureaucratic layer. Teachers also claim that management processes are neither more transparent nor better monitored, even though they occur at the district level. Without authority or significant influence over teacher-related matters, local governments and schools lack the single most important tool to influence the quality of education.

In countries outside East Asia, the approach to managing teachers is also mixed and reveals a willingness to experiment. In Chile and Mexico, control over contracts is centralized, and a national salary scale standardizes teachers' pay. Other countries have encouraged greater local participation. In El Salvador, community education associations are legally responsible for hiring and firing teachers. In the United Kingdom, while the national level sets a minimum pay scale and qualifications for educators, public schools are responsible for hiring and paying their own teachers. In Brazil, communities across an increasing number of municipalities rely on direct elections to select school directors (Namo de Mello 2005).

6. El Pacífico Avanzado: caso de Australia

6.1. Malcolm Skilbeck And Helen Connell, “ATTRACTING, DEVELOPING AND RETAINING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS”. AUSTRALIAN COUNTRY BACKGROUND REPORT For The Commonwealth Government Of Australia

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/50/3879121.pdf>

Teacher employment and related conditions

87. In government schools, teachers are not only employed by the State or Territory in question, but also centrally appointed, with notable exceptions. As part of the devolution process to schools in the 1990s, Victoria now appears to be the only State where individual government schools (in the form of principals or selection panels) may make offers of employment to individuals, although individual schools and their principals are involved in appointments to differing degrees in other jurisdictions. Generally, appointment is either the responsibility of district offices or the State/Territory education department, with teachers either being assigned to specific posts (Queensland) or being able to specify preferred geographic regions (Western Australia). NSW has a statewide staffing system that uses a mix of strategies, including employment, transfer and targeted recruitment programmes, particularly in areas of shortage. Schools identify the nature of each vacant position and the staff system matched applicants to these positions.

88. Teacher appointments in the Australian Capital Territory government sector involve close collaboration between the government education department and school principals. In South Australia and Queensland there are roles for principals in teacher appointments as part of an evident, if as yet only partial, trend in Australia toward greater ‘localisation’ of decision-making.

89. Public employment is always by the State or Territory and in accordance with Industrial Awards, or Enterprise Bargaining Agreements. Conditions vary in detail but are broadly common throughout the country. Contracts are 1–3 years to ongoing in Victoria. In NSW, teachers may be casual (paid on an hourly or daily casual rate of pay), temporary (employed full time for four weeks or more or employed for 1–4 days per week for two terms or more) or permanent staff. All States and Territories employ casual relief staff as needed. In South Australia, contract teachers have recently been made permanent.

90. The Catholic diocesan systems employ their teachers, whereas the great majority of independent schools act as employers in their own right.

6.2. Estado de New South Wales. Erika Zimmer, “Australia: performance-based contracts planned for school principals”, 2004

<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/nov2004/teac-n17.shtml>

School principals

The Labor government in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) has introduced measures allowing it to dismiss public school principals who fail to meet as yet unspecified performance criteria. The move is a thinly-veiled step toward placing principals and all teachers on fixed-term contracts, with salaries tied to performance.

Legislation was unveiled in parliament last month, giving the Education Department's director-general open-ended powers to determine benchmarks for the state's 2,200 school principals. Principals will be "measured against key accountabilities" including, but not limited to, students' test results, student enrolment and retention data, planning and budget management, and resource and risk management.

Under the Teaching Services Amendment Bill 2004, principals will be reviewed "at least" annually but more often if deemed necessary by the director-general. Principals who fail to meet targets will be put on a "performance improvement program". Those who fail to satisfactorily complete such a program will be subject to dismissal or demotion.

In addition to annual reviews, a principal's appointment to a particular school will be assessed every five years, and the positions of principal and senior staff will be opened up to applicants from the private school sector and from other Australian states.

Up to now, NSW school principals have been employed as permanent teachers, able to be dismissed only through a breach of conduct. The new laws also "streamline" the process of sacking principals on misconduct grounds.

Performance testing is designed to pave the way for contract employment. The Kennett Liberal government in neighbouring Victoria introduced employment contracts for principals in 1994, replacing the previous Labor government's system of employing principals on five or seven year fixed-term appointments. It then extended the system to classroom teachers. After Kennett was ousted in 1999, partly due to widespread hostility to his education cutbacks, the incoming Bracks Labor government retained contract employment.

By linking employment to a school's performance in statewide tests, the NSW legislation will accelerate the move away from child-centred learning, in which the individual's interests and needs are taken into account, back to narrow, test-centred teaching methods that were discredited more than half a century ago. The increased focus on school rankings will place pressure on principals to exclude those students requiring the most attention, such as students with learning or behavioural difficulties.

The legislation takes a major step toward transforming school principals into managers, whose primary focus is not the education of students but budgeting and account keeping. In order to keep their jobs, they will have to regiment and police teachers, insisting that they conform to official performance measurements.

A recent survey undertaken in Victoria found 8 out of 10 principals experiencing high levels of stress, with half reporting work-related illnesses and some suffering breakdowns or even committing suicide. Their chief difficulty, the report said, was attempting to reconcile their responsibility to their students with the demands placed upon them by the education department.

The proposal follows the agenda being pursued by governments internationally to undermine state-run schools. Under-funded schools in poorer regions will be hardest hit and the onus placed on the principal, rather than the education department, to decide where to cut spending. Parents seeking a decent education for their children will feel increasingly obliged to send them to private schools, requiring the payment of costly fees.

In Britain, after national school tables were established, poorly performing schools—the majority from disadvantaged areas—were threatened with funding cuts and closure. Devolution of increased powers to principals under the “Tomorrow’s Schools” reforms in New Zealand overwhelmingly disadvantaged schools in low-income districts.

In Australia, private schools have been allocated massive funding increases, encouraging a steady rise in private school enrolments at the expense of government schools. Public schools and teachers have been blamed for the drop in enrolments, with teachers’ “inflexible” working conditions a regular target of attack in the media.

In its May budget, the federal Howard government tied school funding to a range of measures, such as the publication of school performance benchmarks in order to rank schools, and increased autonomy for principals, including the right to hire and fire teachers.

Premier Bob Carr’s government in NSW is not the only state Labor administration to introduce legislation in line with these policies. The Western Australian government has declared that from 2005, principals will be appointed to schools for only five-year periods. Teachers in metropolitan schools will also be given “five year postings” after which they can be “moved on” by principals.

7. Una perspectiva internacional

7.1. “Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers - Final Report: Teachers Matter”

http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,2340,en_2649_34521_34991988_1_1_1_1,00.html

Resume ejecutivo: extractos

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/36/34991371.pdf>

Los profesores constituyen los recursos más significativos de los centros educativos y, como tales, son esenciales para los esfuerzos de mejora de la escuela. El mejorar la eficacia y la equidad de la escolaridad depende, en gran medida, de que pueda garantizarse que los profesores sean personas competentes, que su enseñanza sea de calidad y que todos los estudiantes tengan acceso a una docencia de excelente calidad.

El presente documento proporciona un panorama del principal proyecto de la OCDE en la materia, *Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers* (Atraer, capacitar y conservar profesores eficientes), en el que han participado veinticinco países: Alemania, Australia, Austria, Bélgica (comunidad flamenca), Bélgica (comunidad francófona), Canadá (Quebec), Chile, Corea, Dinamarca, España, Estados Unidos, Finlandia, Francia, Grecia, Hungría, Irlanda, Israel, Italia, Japón, México, Noruega, Países Bajos, Reino Unido, República de Eslovenia, Suecia y Suiza.

La selección y contratación de los profesores

- En la mayoría de países, se plantean numerosas interrogantes en relación con la desigual repartición de los profesores por centros educativos y, en particular, si los

estudiantes de las zonas más desfavorecidas tienen acceso a los profesores de calidad que necesitan.

- Los establecimientos escolares suelen participar poco en el nombramiento de sus profesores.
- Algunos países tienen un exceso de oferta de profesores cualificados, lo que plantea otras cuestiones en relación con las políticas que adoptar.

La permanencia de los profesores eficientes en los centros educativos

- Algunos países tienen elevados índices de desgaste de los docentes, en particular, en el caso de los profesores jóvenes.
- Los profesores se inquietan por las repercusiones que puedan tener la carga de trabajo, el estrés y ciertos entornos de trabajo poco acogedores en la satisfacción laboral y la eficacia de la docencia.
- En la mayor parte de los países, los medios para reconocer y recompensar el trabajo de los profesores son limitados.
- Los procedimientos para enfrentarse a una docencia ineficaz suelen ser pesados y lentos.

La edad media del cuerpo docente complica muchas de las anteriores cuestiones. En promedio, el 25% de los profesores de primaria y el 30% de los de secundaria tienen más de 50 años y, en algunos países, más del 40% de los profesores nacionales pertenecen a este grupo de edad.

Con todo, existen indicios positivos que prueban que las políticas pueden cambiar la situación, tal y como lo muestran los ejemplos proporcionados en el informe. Hay países en los que los profesores gozan de una buena posición social y en los que existen más aspirantes cualificados que puestos vacantes. Incluso en los países en los que la escasez de profesores viene constituyendo un problema, se ha registrado recientemente un resurgimiento del interés por la docencia, y las iniciativas políticas en la materia parecen estar dando resultados.

Implicaciones según los países

No todas las implicaciones de las políticas se aplican de igual forma a los 25 países participantes. En algunos casos, muchas de las orientaciones políticas ya están en marcha, mientras que en otros países pueden revestir menor importancia debido a la diferencia de estructuras y costumbres sociales, económicas o educativas.

Aunque la mayoría de los profesores trabajan para el sector público, los modelos básicos de empleo en este sector difieren de un país a otro. Existen principalmente dos modelos de configuración del empleo del cuerpo docente, claramente identificables en los países participantes: el basado en la carrera o el basado en los puestos y, pese a que ningún país sigue de forma “pura” uno de los dos modelos, la distinción resulta útil para clarificar las características del empleo de los profesores.

En los sistemas basados en la carrera, se espera por lo general que los profesores permanezcan en el servicio público a lo largo de toda su vida laboral. El ingreso en el cuerpo suele hacerse joven, sobre la base de la calificación académica o de un examen de ingreso al cuerpo de funcionarios, y los criterios de admisión suelen ser muy exigentes.

Una vez contratados, los profesores son destinados a sus puestos según normas internas.

El sistema de ascensos se basa en un sistema de grados vinculados a los méritos personales más que a un puesto específico. Los salarios iniciales son relativamente bajos, pero hay una vía clara para alcanzar ingresos más elevados, y los esquemas de pensiones suelen ser bastante generosos. Corea, España Francia y Japón reúnen muchas de las características de los servicios públicos basados en la carrera.

Por lo general, los países con este tipo de sistema no tienen actualmente mayores problemas con la oferta de profesores; de hecho, la mayoría cuenta con muchos más candidatos bien calificados que puestos disponibles. Los problemas en esta clase de sistema son más bien de naturaleza cualitativa; en particular, puede que la educación del profesorado no responda adecuadamente a las necesidades escolares; los criterios de ingreso en el cuerpo no siempre hacen hincapié en las aptitudes que se requiere para una docencia eficaz; una vez obtenida la plaza, los profesores carecen de incentivos para seguir evolucionando; y la excesiva normativización limita la capacidad y la incentivación para que los centros respondan a diversas necesidades locales. Además, estos sistemas carecen de atractivo para quienes no están seguros de querer dedicarse toda la vida a la carrera de profesor o para aquellos que ya hayan adquirido experiencia en otras carreras. Por lo tanto, las principales prioridades de las políticas en esos países deberán ser: el forjar vínculos más sólidos entre la educación inicial, la selección y el desarrollo profesional de los docentes; introducir puestos de trabajo más flexibles; ampliar las posibilidades de contratación externa; y otorgar a las autoridades educativas y a los centros educativos locales más margen de decisión personal.

Los servicios públicos basados en los puestos tienden a centrarse en contratar al mejor candidato para un puesto dado, ya sea mediante contratación externa o mediante promoción interna. Por lo general, este tipo de sistemas permite un acceso más amplio a un vasto abanico de edades, y es relativamente común acceder a la enseñanza desde otras carreras al igual que suele ser frecuente el movimiento de la enseñanza a otros trabajos y el posterior regreso a la enseñanza. Aunque los salarios iniciales son a menudo muy atractivos, alcanzan su valor máximo relativamente pronto dentro de la carrera profesional. El ascenso del profesorado depende de la competencia por los puestos vacantes, y el número de vacantes de alto nivel suele ser limitado. Normalmente, en estos sistemas, la selección y gestión del personal está descentralizada y se halla en manos de las escuelas o las autoridades locales. Canadá, Reino Unido, Suecia y Suiza presentan numerosas características del empleo público basado en los puestos.

Algunos de estos sistemas tienen problemas para contratar a profesores, en especial, en las áreas de matemáticas, ciencias y tecnologías de la información y la comunicación.

Aunque las condiciones del empleo público en esos países se asemejan a las del sector privado, el sector público suele carecer de suficiente flexibilidad para competir con el privado. Además, estos sistemas suelen hallar dificultades para conservar un núcleo de profesores experimentados más allá de los 30-40 años. En consecuencia, las escuelas

suelen tener muchos cambios de profesorado, en particular en las zonas más desfavorecidas.

Las prioridades políticas en los países con dicho sistema incluyen prestar más atención a los criterios generales de selección del personal docente, la evaluación de resultados y la creación de vías para hacer carrera. Dado que los gestores locales desempeñan una función primordial en la gestión del personal y en la adaptación de los programas escolares a las necesidades locales, esos países también tendrán que insistir relativamente más en la selección y la formación de los directores y otros directivos de las escuelas. Además, como la selección y gestión del profesorado en estos sistemas se asemeja más a la del mercado, habrá que dotar con bastantes más recursos a los establecimientos que se hallen en zonas desfavorecidas o con mala fama para que puedan competir por tener profesores de calidad y será necesario diferenciar mucho más los salarios y las condiciones laborales a fin de atraer a los diversos tipos de profesores en caso de escasez de oferta.

Capítulo 5: Recruiting, selecting and employing teachers (Summary)

Teacher policy needs to ensure that the best available teachers are selected for employment, and that individual schools have the teachers they need. This chapter outlines concerns about recruiting, selecting and employing teachers and develops policy options for countries to consider.

Teachers are generally employed as public servants, and in a number of countries this is associated with tenured employment once permanency is obtained. There may not be sufficient incentives for all teachers to continuously review their skills and improve their practice, especially where there are only limited mechanisms for teacher evaluation and accountability. Policy options include the requirement that teachers renew their teacher certificates every five to seven years, built on an open, fair and transparent system of teacher evaluation.

The selection criteria for new teachers need to be broadened to ensure that the applicants with the greatest potential are identified. Some countries are reducing the weight accorded to seniority in determining which candidates are appointed to teaching vacancies, so as to avoid beginning teachers being assigned to the more difficult and unpopular schools. The evidence suggests that greater school involvement in teacher selection and personnel management helps to improve educational quality.

There is considerable evidence that some beginning teachers, no matter how well prepared and supported, struggle to perform well or find that the job does not meet their expectations. A formal probationary process can provide an opportunity for both new teachers and their employers to assess whether teaching is the right career for them.

In some countries the limited mobility of teachers between schools, and between teaching and other occupations, restricts the spread of new ideas and approaches, and results in teachers having few opportunities for diverse career experiences. The lack of mobility may mean that teacher shortages in some regions are paralleled by oversupply in others.

Providing incentives for greater mobility and removing barriers are important policy responses.

7.2. “Teachers For Tomorrow’s Schools: Analysis Of The World Education Indicators”. Oecd - Unesco – Wei Program, 2001

Resumen ejecutivo

<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001242/124265e.pdf>

Entre otras cosas, este reporte considera los desafíos para asegurar un profesorado hábil y motivado.

En primer lugar se señala importancia del monto y forma en que se entregan los salarios entre estos trabajadores. En el caso de los países en vías de desarrollo, puede ocurrir que individuos altamente educados vean en esta profesión el único empleo posible de obtener. Sin embargo, apenas otras áreas de las economías de los países comienzan a mejorar y si los salarios de los docentes se mantienen, las personas altamente calificadas emigrarán a otras áreas.

Las escalas de salarios uniformes no sirven para motivar a los profesores a dar lo mejor de sí, ni a reducir la falta de profesores en ciertas áreas.

Muchos de los países WEI no han adoptado aún una forma de entrega de bonos para recompensar a los mejores profesores, aunque esta política debe ser cuidadosamente evaluada caso a caso.

En cuanto a las condiciones de trabajo se señala que un sistema balanceado (entre condiciones de trabajo y salario) contribuye a obtener mejores resultados. Los distintos países realizan decisiones de políticas muy distintas en cuanto a estos ámbitos: así por ejemplo, en algunos países una carga de trabajo más baja que el promedio es compensada con tamaños de clases más grandes. De la misma manera, en países con sueldos comparativamente altos estos se justifican por las muchas horas de trabajo y/o el tamaño grande de la clase.

What teachers are asked and what they are given

Expectations of teachers are high. They need to be experts in one or more specific subjects, and this demands an increasing level of academic qualifications.

They must continually update their expertise and knowledge since, in order to provide tomorrow’s world with the knowledge and skills on which economic and social progress so critically depends, educational institutions and teachers need to respond by developing and delivering appropriate educational content. Moreover, teachers’ subject-matter expertise must be complemented by pedagogical competence, with a focus on the transmission of a range of high-level skills, including the motivation to learn, creativity and co-operation. In some WEI countries, technology is becoming a new feature of professionalism in teaching, requiring an understanding of the pedagogical potential of technology and the ability to integrate it into the teaching-learning process. Finally, professionalism in teaching can no longer be seen as an individual competence, but must include the ability to function as part of a “learning organisation” and the capacity and willingness to move in and out of other careers and experiences that can enrich teaching ability.

The global trend towards moving decision-making in education to lower levels of government also affects teachers in the WEI countries in several ways: first, by bringing decisions about teachers (aside from statutory salary scales) closer to the locality and the school and, second, by asking teachers to play a greater role in managing the system. Some countries have adopted a model in which schools operate within a centrally determined framework of curricula and standards, but are given a considerable amount of autonomy and responsibility for decisions.

The demands placed on teachers are therefore considerable. The balance between what is required of teachers and what is offered to them has a significant impact on the composition of the teaching force and the quality of teaching. Attracting skilled individuals and retaining them in the teaching profession is an essential prerequisite for ensuring high-quality education in the future.

This report considers the challenges posed by the need to secure a skilled and motivated teaching force, and examines some of the policy choices and trade-offs that countries make when balancing expanded access to education with the need to attract and retain good teachers.

Salaries

The relative level of teachers' salaries and the availability of salary increases during the course of teachers' careers can affect the decision by qualified individuals to enter or to remain in the teaching profession. At the same time, the pressure to improve the quality of education is often subject to tight fiscal constraints, and teachers' salaries and allowances are the largest single factor in the cost of providing education, accounting for two-thirds or more of public expenditure on education in most countries. The impact of various elements of the total compensation package varies from country to country, and within a given country, over time. If the compensation package is too generous there will be a surplus of qualified applicants for the profession. In addition, teaching is sometimes one of the few occupations in developing countries available to individuals with a high level of education. In such cases, there is no effective market alternative, and even low levels of compensation will attract qualified applicants. As other areas of the economy begin to develop, however, there is likely to be a sudden exodus of the best qualified teachers from teaching into more attractive new positions.

While uniform salary scales are transparent and simple to administer, they do not help to motivate teachers to perform at their best, nor do they help to solve problems of shortages of teachers in certain subjects or in rural areas. Among the policy options that many WEI countries have not yet fully exploited are bonuses as a means of adjusting the remuneration of teachers without altering the basic government scales. Such adjustments may serve different aims, such as rewarding teachers who take on responsibilities or duties beyond statutory norms, attracting better candidates to the teaching profession, encouraging teachers to improve their performance, or attracting teachers into subject areas where demand is greater than supply, for example science and mathematics, or to rural locations where there is a scarcity of applicants.

The payment of bonuses has to be weighed carefully, however, and their impact evaluated from case to case since there is evidence that they may elicit responses from teachers that have an effect opposite to that which is intended, impairing school effectiveness and hence student achievement.

The examples of pay schemes discussed in this report show nonetheless that bonus schemes can be effective.

Material incentives for teachers are not the only factors of significance in attempts to improve the quality of education. This report examines other important indicators of the working conditions of teachers, including hours of teaching and instruction, class size and student-teacher ratios. If the working conditions for the teaching force and their associated costs are to be judged accurately, all of these indicators need to be considered in combination rather than in isolation. Together, they can help to show whether teachers are being asked to do too much or too little, and whether trade-offs are well balanced. An unbalanced system may lead to poor morale among teachers, difficulties in recruiting qualified staff, and an exodus from the profession. It may also reflect a less efficient teaching process, leading to higher costs of teaching. A balanced system contributes to more effective teaching and hence to better learning outcomes.

When governments decide on their education budgets, they need to make trade-offs between factors such as the level of teachers' salaries, the size of classes, the number of teaching hours required of teachers and the intended instruction time for students.

Some countries seek to increase the competitiveness of teachers' salaries and/or to raise enrolment levels by increasing student-teacher ratios, sometimes in combination with the introduction of new teaching technologies.

However, while this may be a viable option for improving the effectiveness of education systems in some WEI countries, student-teacher ratios already exceed 40 students per full-time equivalent teacher in others, where it will be difficult to respond to the increased demand for teachers by raising the ratio further without risking deterioration in the quality of educational provision.

This report shows that countries make differing policy choices about these trade-offs. In some countries, a lower than average teaching load is compensated by larger class sizes, while in other countries, smaller than average class sizes add to a light teaching load, increasing the salary costs per student. In Chile, the Philippines and Thailand, comparatively high statutory salaries for primary teachers are compensated by a high number of teaching hours or larger than average classes, while in Indonesia, low salaries and a high number of teaching hours are partially offset by smaller classes. Uruguay, on the other hand, combines small primary-level classes with a low number of hours of instruction and high salaries.

These examples illustrate that there are a various approaches for managing teacher deployment. The question of which approach is better may be a natural one, but not entirely appropriate. Each education system is a working system, which to a greater or lesser degree has satisfied the requirements of its society.

The different policy choices discussed in this report represent a long history of decisions taken nationally and are subject to a certain inertia that makes it difficult to introduce substantial changes overnight, if for no other reason than that some features of the system are subject to negotiation in the framework of collective bargaining agreements. The success of a approach may also depend on less quantifiable characteristics of the education system, such as the teaching methods used or the extent of remedial help

available. The interplay between, for example, class size and teaching methods is far from clear. Small classes may mean that more attention to individual students is possible, but in the absence of curriculum reform or of a change in teaching practices, for example, the expected benefits may not be forthcoming.

While it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the different policy options, the analysis in *Teachers for Tomorrow's Schools* shows that there is room for choice and that international comparative analysis can be a useful instrument for informing the debate. Future research is needed to elaborate the potential impacts of the different strategies adopted by countries. It needs to identify countries that ask too much or too little of teachers, or give too much or too little to teachers in return. More information is needed about how teachers themselves perceive their profession and its demands and incentives, particularly at the classroom level. Proposed changes in the levels of resources invested, in the management of teachers, or in teaching and learning conditions, need to be seen in the context of overall public policy, which governs the complex relationship between teacher deployment, the internal efficiency of the education system, and learning outcomes. More extensive micro-level data, especially more comprehensive and reliable measures of student achievement, are required in order to understand this relationship.